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 1   Introduction 
In low income countries every budget season brings the challenge of 
cutting needed programs or taking the unpopular step of raising taxes.  In this 
setting, the imposition of a special tax on soft drinks is a fiscal temptation.  Soft 
drinks are a highly visible product, usually produced by a foreign company with 
good compliance habits, and are alleged to bring health problems with their 
consumption. The revenue amounts may not be great but the pickings are 
relatively easy.  Many governments in developing countries do impose a special 
excise tax on soft drink consumption.  The question raised in this chapter is 
whether they should. 
 This paper begins with a discussion of the general approach to soft drink 
taxation, and a description of the practice in a number of African countries.  Then 
we turn to the question of whether these excises are discriminating, review the 
traditional justifications for a special excise, and apply this thinking to the case of 
soft drinks.  The paper concludes with a summary of findings and a discussion of 
the cost of getting it wrong, i.e., the cost of imposing a discriminatory excise 
when it is not warranted. 
 
2    The Practice: African Examples 
  A commonly found business model is for soft drinks to be produced and 
distributed by a partnership of a foreign company and a local bottler.  The usual 
distribution of responsibility is that the foreign company is responsible for 
supplying the concentrate and for marketing, while the bottler imports the inputs, 
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mixes the concentrate, bottles and distributes the product.  The market is usually 
dominated by the foreign, popular brand name soft drinks. 
 
2.1 The Taxation of Soft Drinks2  
Countries are different in terms of how they structure their tax regimes, 
and in terms of the revenue importance they assign to each tax, but the general 
approach to bringing soft drinks into the tax base is more or less the same as for 
other consumer goods.  
 In Table 1, we describe the major taxes to which soft drinks usually are 
subjected, and we offer a view about what would constitute discriminatory 
treatment.  The country example on which we base the description in Table 1 is 
Ghana, but a reasonable proposition is that this is similar to the tax treatment of 
soft drinks in other countries. The customs duty, excise tax, value added tax and 
corporate income tax are collected directly from the bottler, and their employees 
are subject to individual income taxes and payroll taxes according to the tax 
code.  In the case of corporate income taxes and PAYE, there would not appear 
to be any discrimination against soft drink producers vs. other producers in the 
formal sector.3   
Most raw material inputs for soft drinks are imported, and are subject to 
the normal concessional duty rate on raw materials.  This concessional rate 
                                            
2
 For purposes of taxation, soft drinks may be singled out as a taxable item or may be treated as 
a class of goods that are labeled “table waters”, “mineral water” or “carbonated beverages.” 
3
 Soft drink bottlers are not usually candidates for corporate income tax incentives. If other 
companies do receive incentives, then it might be argued that the soft drink bottler is treated in a 
differential way.  However, this is no different from the tax treatment faced by other non-incentive 
firms. 
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applies to the concentrate, sugar, and other inputs such as containers and caps.  
This is consistent with the normal practice for manufactured goods as set out in 
the customs code in most countries.  The duty rate charged these imports is 
normally the same as that charged to most imported food and clothing items.4  It 
is less the norm for imports for soft drink production to be taxed in a 
discriminatory way. 
 Soft drinks face a discriminatory tax treatment in some countries in that 
they are subject to an excise tax, over and above the VAT. Typically only a small 
number of consumer goods pay the excise tax. The marquee cases are those 
items whose consumption generates social costs, e.g., alcohol, tobacco and 
motor fuels.  The base of the excise tax may be specific or ad valorem, and is 
usually measured in the latter case as the manufacturer’s cost plus margin.  The 
value of the base is determined by the VAT administration, based on information 
supplied by the bottler and based on its own checks. This is a more or less 
standard method of excise tax administration.     
The VAT on soft drinks is usually collected at the factory at the general tax 
rate, on a base that is the ex-factory price including the excise tax paid and 
distribution costs.  Because the excise tax is included in the base, one could 
argue that there is an additional element of discrimination in the VAT regime.  
Specifically, the VAT base for soft drinks is higher by the amount of the excise 
tax rate.  
  
                                            
4
 It should be noted, however that in some countries, certain imported raw materials for 
agricultural production are fully exempt, and others are given special exemptions. 
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Under such a tax regime, soft drinks will be subject to a tax rate (r*) of  
  r* =                
while other goods face a rate of    
where: 
    = special excise tax rate 
    = general value added tax rate 
At the rate levels that are more or less common in Africa (about 15 percent for 
    and from 5-50 percent for   ), the after tax difference in the relative price of 
soft drinks vs. other products could be substantial in countries that levy a special 
excise. 
 
 2.2   The Practice in Africa.   
There is a wide variation in the practice of soft drink taxation in Africa.  
The countries that make up the Southern Africa Region have a value added tax 
and do not impose a special tax on soft drinks.  On the other hand, many other 
African countries that do levy a VAT also levy a special excise on soft drinks.  
There is no easily read pattern that flags the institutional arrangements or 
economic structure of countries that choose to levy a special excise vs. those 
that do not. 
 As may be seen from Table 2, there is significant variation in the rate of 
special excise tax on soft drinks among African countries.  Among VAT countries, 
the ad valorem rates are as low as 2.75 percent in Senegal and 5 percent in 
Chad, but as high as 20 percent in Ghana.  In Ethiopia and Angola, which do not 
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levy a VAT, the tax rate on soft drinks is 80 percent and 20 percent, respectively 
(Table 3).  
 
3   What Constitutes Discriminatory Treatment? 
 Fairness in taxation would call for soft drinks to be treated the same as 
any other consumption good, unless there is a proper justification for not doing 
so.  The difficulty here is defining a proper justification.  In fact, there are many 
different views about the rationale for imposing a differentially higher rate of tax 
on soft drinks.  For economists interested in economic efficiency, the answer is 
an easy one.  If the consumption of a good imposes a social cost, such as might 
come from a Negative impact on health, it is a candidate for a special excise tax 
to discourage its consumption.  For some social reformers, the issue may be that 
production of the good siphons off scarce resources within the country and 
increases the profits of foreign-owned companies.  For those who see vertical 
equity as a pressing need in tax reform, the strategy of labeling a soft drink a 
luxury good and taxing it more heavily, holds great appeal.  Many governments 
use all of these as proper justifications for raising more revenues from special 
excises.  If the justifications really are supported by the evidence, advocates can 
argue that special excises on soft drinks do not constitute an unwarranted 
differential treatment. This is not to say that special excises are the best 
instrument for achieving the policy objective, but in some normative sense they 
are not discriminatory.   
On the face of it, all of these justifications for a special excise on soft 
                                                                 Taxing Soft Drinks                                                                         7         
 
 
 
drinks have some merit.  But, each may be effectively challenged on a basis of 
having the facts wrong about soft drink consumption, or because a special excise 
on soft drinks would introduce some unwanted inequity in the consumption tax 
system, or because other important complications and costs have been ignored.  
For example, if there is evidence of an external effect, the question will be how to 
choose a tax rate that will discourage soft drink consumption by the desired 
amount?  If the use of scarce national resources is the concern, then the 
question will be what “better” investments are being crowded out.  If vertical 
equity is the issue, then the problem will be to identify all luxury goods that 
should be subjected to special taxation.  So, even if there is something to the 
“proper justification” reasoning, much remains to be done to translate this into a 
sensible policy. 
 Some justifications fail the good policy test by a wider margin.  One is the 
revenue enhancement argument, i.e., that a special excise is good tax policy 
because administration is easy and because the politics are right, even if there is 
no other justification. This would seem wrong-headed.  Surely there are better, 
non-discriminatory ways to mobilize additional revenues (Cnossen, 2005).  
Another reason for special excises, not often explicitly discussed, is the 
protection of domestic companies that produce substitute products. The negative 
effects of protection on the economy are widely discussed. 
 The foreign companies that profit from soft drink consumption will argue 
against any differential tax treatment. Even if they concede that an external social 
cost is present, they may take the position that the excise tax is too high relative 
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to other goods that impose social costs.  The soft drink producers may take the 
position that reduction, or even elimination of the excise tax will not lead to a 
revenue loss because of the increased production that will follow the tax cuts.  
Often, however, even correct arguments made by the companies are obscured 
by the transparency of their tax reduction motive.  Other times, the soft drink 
company’s proposals are dismissed because the arguments are badly made, for 
example that employment generated by soft drinks production warrants lower 
taxes.   Sometimes, however, the lobbying efforts of the soft drink companies are 
successful. 
 
4   Externalities from Soft Drink Consumption 
Candidates for a discriminatory excise are tested for whether or not they 
impose an external cost. For example, it may be argued that the consumption of 
cigarettes imposes health risks to smokers and to those who are around 
smokers, productivity losses in the work place, and health care costs on society. 
The consumption of liquor might be argued to increase costs to society in the 
form of increased automobile accidents, drinking-related crime, and the 
maintenance of alcohol abuse centers. Gasoline consumption is associated with 
increased levels of air pollution and increased congestion that must be suffered 
by others.   
Society seems to accept the idea that tax policy can be used to curb 
consumption of the offending goods, and/or that it is desirable for consumers and 
producers of those products to compensate society. However, in practice, 
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revenues are rarely earmarked for purposes of paying for these social costs, or 
to compensate those who are harmed.5  Moreover, the tax rates are rarely set 
with reference to the estimated amount of external costs, emphasizing again the 
fact that the revenue mobilization motive is paramount. 
 
4.1   Health Concerns   
The issue most often raised in the case of soft drinks is whether there are 
negative health effects associated with soft drink consumption and whether these 
are large enough to justify a discriminatory tax. Carbonated soft drinks are 
thought by many to be associated with a number of health-related problems.  
Among these concerns are obesity, diabetes, bone health, and dental problems. 
This is a special concern in Africa, where there is a high incidence of ill health 
related to heavy consumption of sugar.  The number of people seeking medical 
assistance for diabetes is rising in Africa at a time when health experts say the 
continent's overburdened health care systems are ill-equipped to diagnose the 
disease and the majority of the poor cannot afford the cost of treatment 9world 
Diabetes Foundation, 2010).   The industry argues that these concerns about the 
linkage between soft drinks and diabetes are misplaced and not supported by 
scientific evidence.  (The Coca Cola company, 2003).   
We do not comment further on the scientific merit of these arguments.    If 
there are not health-related external effects, there is little more to say here about 
                                            
5
 An interesting note on earmarking of the excise tax on soft drinks (or table waters) is that the tax 
in Ireland was originally earmarked to support the Boer War, while that imposed in the US in 1918 
was dedicated to WWI finances.  
 
10                                               International Studies Program Working Paper Series 
 
this justification for a special excise.  So, let us assume for the sake of discussion 
that there are negative health effects associated with the consumption of soft 
drinks.  Even with this assumption, however, the case for a special excise on soft 
drinks will depend on whether the offending ingredients are contained only in 
carbonated beverages. Most often mentioned in this regard are sugar, 
phosphoric acid, caffeine and aspartame. These are, in fact, widely used 
ingredients. If government is convinced that these ingredients do impose a health 
risk, then all products containing these substances should be subjected the same 
tax treatment. If excessive sugar content is the problem, then the tax should be 
levied on all offending products, and should not single out soft drinks.   
The taxation of products according to their mix of ingredients is not so far-
fetched.  For example, a proposal for a “sugar tax” in Iceland would be levied on 
all products that contain a high percentage of sugar, such as candy and soft 
drinks (Tax Notes International, June 2009). Structuring taxes around ingredients 
is likely to be a more difficult task for developing countries, but it could be done.   
  
4.2   Environmental Concerns   
Another possible external effect from soft drink consumption is the 
environmental cost associated with disposal of the aluminum, plastic and glass 
containers.  The question here is who should pay this cost.  Does this justify a 
differentially higher tax on soft drinks than on other products?   
The answer to this question parallels that given for health concerns.  
Carbonated soft drinks are not the only product that imposes an external cost 
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associated with packaging. On the one hand, there can be little argument but that 
consumers of soft drinks should bear their share of these costs. On the other 
hand, the share of the carbonated beverage industry in containers is relatively 
small.  For Ireland, it is estimated that only about 2 percent of all household 
volume of waste is beverage containers (Bahl and Walker, p 9).  This suggests 
that other consumer good industries should be subject to a similar tax based on 
their potential waste and recycle cost. A special excise levied only on carbonated 
beverage consumption would not seem justified on these grounds. A tax to 
recover the cost of disposal for packaged goods, however, may be well beyond 
the reach of the tax administration in most low income countries.     
 
4.3   Rough Justice   
The externality justification for an excise tax is generally accepted, but it 
provides more of a rough guideline for taxation than a hard and fast rule.  It also 
requires subjective decisions about when a “taxable external event” should be 
declared.  In fact, there are externalities associated with most consumption.  
Soccer games can lead to riots, fast foods might impose health and productivity 
costs, TV can lead to aberrant behavior, etc.  All consumption that leads to 
external effects is not subject to a special tax, and few would argue that all 
problems with external effects should be solved with tax policy.  The operational 
question is where to draw the line when deciding on which products should be 
subjected to excise tax.   
Even if a government does find the externality argument convincing, then 
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it must establish an excise tax rate for soft drinks.  There are two factors that it 
might consider in doing this.  First, since governments rarely if ever even attempt 
to make an estimate of social costs, the tax rate cannot be determined as a cost 
recovery amount.  More likely it is set so as to generate a certain (target) amount 
of revenue and probably is influenced by the rate in other countries in the region. 
Second, there is the question of the relative level of the tax rate for soft 
drinks vis a vis competing goods.  If soft drinks are in a category with malt drinks, 
energy drinks, flavored waters and juices, then what is the justification for taxing 
these at different rates?  The practice varies on this.  The same rate is applied to 
soft drinks and malt beverages in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Nigeria, but malt 
beverages are subject to a lower rate in Ghana.   
A related issue is establishing the correct rate difference between soft 
drinks and the presumably more socially costly consumption of liquor, beer and 
tobacco. There is no straightforward answer here but the varied practice 
illustrates the difficulty of making this decision. For example, in Senegal, soft 
drinks are taxed at 2.75 percent but coffee and tea at 5 percent while in Guinea-
Bissau, soft drinks and beer are both taxed at 5 percent. 
  
5   Resource Allocation    
Governments use tax policy to support an export-led economic 
development strategy.  One argument is that production and consumption of non-
essential goods and services will crowd out more productive uses of resources in 
the economy, i.e., investment in capital intensive, export-oriented industries.  
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Another concern is that production of consumer goods may place a heavy 
enough claim on natural resources that more productive activities may be limited.  
For example, soft drinks production places a significant claim on water 
resources, which might be scarce. These concerns might lead to higher rates for 
the general consumption tax, or to tax incentives to directly influence savings and 
investment. 
The same reasoning is followed by some government planners who would 
impose an excise tax regime on a small number of products e.g., soft drinks, 
cigarette lighters, TV sets, cosmetics, etc.  By discouraging the consumption of 
these products, it is thought that resources would be freed up for the more 
productive sectors.  The “social engineers” may also have a protection motive, 
i.e., discouraging the consumption of foreign-produced luxury goods in favor of 
consumption of domestically produced goods.   
There are many questions to ask about this justification for special 
excises. First, it substitutes administrative decisions for market signals about 
what production is "best" for the economy, and raises the more general question 
about the extent to which the economy will be planned or market driven.  
Second, it would seem to fit a full employment economy --- where skilled labor 
will be displaced by soft drink production --- than an African economy.  Third, if 
protection is part of this discriminatory tax regime, inefficiency in domestic 
production may be encouraged, and the more fundamental reforms in economic 
policy may be delayed or postponed.  Fourth, such policies require governments 
to identify those goods that will be subject to the special excise, and to name the 
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rates of tax, and these decisions will almost certainly be arbitrary.  One set of tax 
engineers may want to discourage the consumption of soft drinks and cameras, 
another may target TV sets and matches, and yet another would narrow the tax 
rate differential between soft drinks and beer.  For all of these reasons, an 
increase in the general consumption tax is a better route than an excise on 
certain goods.  
Some analysts have cautioned that the imposition of a special excise tax 
will create other undesirable resource allocation effects, particularly in the case of 
cigarettes and alcoholic beverages (Bird and Wallace, 2006).  For example, 
smuggling of cigarettes is largely attributable to a differentially higher excise tax 
rate compared to surrounding countries.  A higher tax rate on liquor might cause 
consumers to shift toward home brews that are both outside the tax net and may 
pose some serious health hazards.  Such undesirable displacement effects in 
consumption are not likely to happen in the case of soft drinks, because of the 
bulkiness of the item (in the case of smuggling) and the limited availability of 
lower priced (illegally produced) domestic substitutes. 
Finally, there is the question of whether discriminatory taxation of soft 
drinks imposes excess burdens on society.  The answer to this question is that 
(in the absence of external effects) it does, by causing consumers to shift away 
from their most desired consumption choices toward other products that are 
more favored by the tax system.  This can happen because fruit juices, soft 
drinks and non alcoholic malt beverages are taxed at different rates, and 
because foodstuff items in general are not subject to an excise tax.   
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The excess burden imposed by a discriminatory tax on soft drinks 
depends on the level of the tax rate and the price elasticity of demand, i.e., on 
the amount by which consumption of soft drinks is displaced because of the 
resulting higher (relative price) of the product.  Certainly the level of the tax rate 
on soft drinks is high enough to influence consumption levels.  Given this tax 
rate, the more price elastic the demand, the greater will be the excess burden.  
Some would make the argument that not much damage is done to consumption 
patterns by the tax on soft drinks because demand is price inelastic.  In fact, 
however, there are a number of substitutes (malt drinks, fruit juices, coffee, tea, 
and even beer.), which suggests that demand is not price inelastic.  The very 
limited amount of research available on this subject in industrialized countries 
has concluded that the price elasticity of demand for soft drinks is about unity 
(Bahl, Bird and Walker, 2003).  As we discuss further below, the imposition of a 
special excise tax on soft drinks does not lead to a large excess burden. 
 
6   Vertical Equity 
Special excises are sometimes defended on grounds that they are 
imposed on luxury goods (such as soft drinks) to improve the overall 
progressivity of the tax system.  Many analysts subscribe to this view.  Bolnick 
and Haughton (1998) in a study of African countries concluded that excise taxes 
should include a small number of luxury items and that increased reliance on 
excise taxes is consistent with an equitable tax system.  However, they stop 
short of defining “luxury items”.  In terms of the practice, the more commonly 
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taxed “luxury goods” are cameras, electronic equipment, stereos, air conditioning 
units, and club dues. Goode (1984, p. 148) also argues that selective taxes on 
luxury consumption may offer a better chance of reaching the rich than do badly 
administered income taxes.   
The vertical equity case for a special excise tax on soft drinks is not so 
easily made. Three questions might be raised. The first is whether the distribution 
of tax burdens is progressive for soft drinks?  There are not a great number of 
empirical studies of the distribution of tax burdens for excisable goods.  Bahl and 
Wallace (2006) estimated the tax burden distribution for Ghana, using the 
consumer expenditure survey and assuming full forward shifting of the tax.  The 
results show that the distribution of the burden on total excise taxes is 
progressive.  However, this result is influenced by the heavier consumption of 
beer and petroleum products in the upper income brackets. Cigarettes, on the 
other hand, show a regressive pattern. The distribution of tax burdens for soft 
drinks was found to be mildly progressive. Younger (1996) reached a similar 
conclusion for the distribution of tax burdens for non-alcoholic beverages. So, it 
might be concluded that the same degree of progressivity for alcoholic beverages 
and motor fuels cannot be imputed to soft drinks. 
  The second question is whether the imposition of a special tax on soft 
drinks would have a noticeable effect on the distribution of tax burdens.  While it 
would appear to be the case that soft drinks are consistent with the idea of luxury 
consumption in that the share of consumer expenditures rises with income level, 
the amount of taxes paid on this product is quite small, and could have only a 
                                                                 Taxing Soft Drinks                                                                         17         
 
 
 
very small effect on the overall distribution of tax burdens.  Even if all 
consumption of luxury goods were brought under this tax, the share of total 
consumption would be small. Cnossen (2005, p 511) makes the point that for 
purposes of improving the progressivity of the tax system, “Probably the motoring 
field is the only case for which luxury excises can be recommended.”   
 If the objective is to tax consumption that is heavily weighted toward 
higher income families, there are many more items than soft drinks that also 
should be included.  The practice in African countries shows a great deal of 
variation in what government fiscal planners consider to be a “luxury”. The usual 
suspects are TV and electronic equipment, clocks, cameras, cosmetics and 
jewelry, but the list can be quite long and includes in various countries, cellular 
air time, matches, coffee and tea, candles and toys (See Tables 2 and 3). 
 These reservations would seem to tilt policy away from using a special 
excise of soft drinks to improve the vertical equity of the tax system.  One is 
probably left with Cnossen’s (2006, p168-169) admonition: there are better ways 
to effect the tax burden distribution than with selective excises.  
 
7   Immoral Behavior 
 A special excise tax may be levied for “moral” reasons.  Drinking and 
smoking are seen by some as immoral activities that ought to be discouraged, 
and higher taxes are imposed to raise the price of these activities in hopes of 
curtailing consumption.  This argument is based on philosophical views rather 
than economics and cannot be evaluated using economic theory or even first 
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principles of tax policy.  It is difficult to see how the consumption of soft drinks 
would offend national sensibilities.   
There also is a paternalistic argument. The price elasticity of teenage 
smoking appears to be greater than that of adults.  An argument is that higher 
priced cigarettes would discourage smoking among youth.  A similar argument 
might be made with reference to teenage obesity and soft drink consumption. 
However, on these grounds, soft drink consumption is not the only legitimate 
target for a special excise.  
 
8   The Revenue Justification 
 Revenue mobilization is arguably the most important reason for excise 
taxation, and probably the dominant reason for levying an special excise on soft 
drinks.  The rationale is straightforward.  Soft drinks are “easy to tax” in that 
production is concentrated in a few plants and can be reached with relatively little 
effort by the collection authority.6 Likewise, imported inputs and final consumer 
products are easily reached.  Moreover, the traditional excisable goods are often 
the product of foreign-owned firms that have a higher rate of voluntary 
compliance.   
 
8.1 Revenue Potential 
 The revenue potential of a special excise tax on soft drinks depends on 
                                            
6
 The premise that excises taxes are easily administered is based partly on the presumption that 
here is no need for accounts, audits or other complicated compliance procedures (Goode, 1984; 
Terper, 2001). 
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the size of the tax base (soft drink consumption) and on the price elasticity of 
demand.  The base is very narrow, surely well less than one percent of GDP, 
hence a price inelastic demand is necessary for any significant amount of 
revenue generation.7 
Soft drinks will be price inelastic in demand if consumers cannot find good 
substitutes for these products.  As a result, they will respond to a special excise 
by consuming at a level close to their pretax consumption level. Gasoline, 
alcoholic beverages and tobacco are commodities that are widely believed to fit 
this profile, and empirical research has verified this (McLure and Thirsk, 1978; 
Viscusi, 2006; and Leung and Phelps, 1993).  Bird and Wallace (2006), however, 
find evidence of strong substitutability for alcohol products in Africa and hence a 
higher price elasticity than is usually supposed.  
There is relatively little by way of quantitative estimates of the price 
elasticity of demand for soft drinks in developing countries.  For Africa, Baah-
Nuakoh, et.al (2000) estimate a price elasticity of 1.5 for Ghana based on an 
econometric analysis for the period 1975-1998. 
The demand for soft drinks may be more price elastic than other excisable 
goods because of the availability of a larger number of substitutes.  Substitutes 
for soft drinks will vary from country to country.  Among the most obvious are 
water, fruit juices, flavored waters, syrups and energy drinks, but there are many 
other possibilities including perhaps ice cream, candy, and entertainment in 
general. At least one review of the soft drink industry in the European economy 
                                            
7
 For discussions of this issue, see Tanzi (1991, Chapters 8 and 10), Bird (1992, Chapter 9), and 
Due (1988, Chapter 4). 
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suggested the wide range of consumer choices available (reported in Bahl and 
Walker, 1999). In a supermarket in Britain, there were 450 “buying options” for 
nonalcoholic beverages. Using a similar measurement method, it estimated that 
there were 320 in Belgium, 480 in France, 500 in Germany, 235 in Netherlands, 
250 in Spain, and 170 in Italy.  And if soft drinks are partly consumed as a 
general entertainment good, they may be replaced by more expenditures on 
movies, ice cream, etc.,  
This thinking would lead us to the conclusion that consumers will move to 
substitutes if discriminatory taxes are imposed, and will increase their 
consumption of soft drinks if discriminatory taxes are remained. In the latter case, 
the increased consumption will cushion (but not eliminate) any revenue loss 
occasioned by a tax rate reduction.  A statistical analysis of the Irish experience 
supports this conclusion, (Bahl and Walker, 1998). 
It is clear that revenue yield from excise taxes is significant and is an 
important part of the government finance structure.  Cnossen (2005) points out 
that excise taxes account for 16 percent of tax revenues in ASEAN countries. In 
Africa, the use of excises is quite varied.  For example, Uganda and the DRC 
receive large portions of their revenue from excise (32 and 24 percent 
respectively) while Botswana receives less than 3 percent of revenue from excise 
taxes (Bird and Wallace, 2006). 
However data do not let us report comparable statistics for excise tax 
revenues from soft drinks.  Case studies suggest that the collections are quite 
small, e.g., about 0.3 percent of total tax collections in Ghana (Bahl and Wallace, 
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2006). 
 
8.2   Political Considerations 
 Soft drinks are an attractive target because the political risk among the 
population is fairly low.  "Why not let smokers, drivers, drinkers and consumers of 
luxury products finance a share of the budget deficit," is a sentiment that seems 
to resonate well with voters. So does “tax the foreigners” to the extent voters 
believe the tax will fall on owners of the producing firm. 
Special excises feel like a “smaller” tax reform to the public, and an 
increase in the tax rate on gasoline or beer is a "quick revenue fix" because the 
collection machinery is already in place and the money can begin to flow quickly. 
Increased excise taxes on drinking, smoking and luxury consumption are less 
dangerous in the eyes of a vote-seeking politician than are rate increases on the 
broad-based taxes. 
The good politics argument is probably a better fit for developing than 
industrial countries. It was finally good economics and EU harmonization efforts 
rather than taxpayer outcry that brought on the abolition of the discriminatory 
excise duties in many European countries.  Of course, the industry kept the 
pressure on to roll the taxes back.  Soft drink producers are always unhappy 
about discriminatory treatment, knowing that their products sell best when prices 
are kept low and on par with those of competing products.  A possible reason for 
the absence of vocal taxpayer opposition to extra taxes on soft drinks is that 
these often are not directly collected from consumers.  Most taxpayers may not 
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fully realize the extent to which the tax has increased the price of the beverage, 
thus making excise duties “invisible”.8 
 
9   Tax Policy Choices for Soft Drinks 
There are a number of policy choices open for the taxation of soft drinks: 
impose a special excise on soft drinks, reform the existing special excise tax on 
soft drinks, and reduce or eliminate the special excise on soft drinks.  All three of 
these options have received significant play in recent years and various 
governments have followed all three paths. 
 
9.1   Impose a special excise   
The case for a special excise on soft drinks may not be strong, but the 
revenue needs of African governments are substantial.  Even small contributions 
to the general budget make a difference.  Moreover, there are positive features of 
an excise tax on soft drinks:  administration is manageable, and there is not likely 
to be a major political uproar over the imposition of the tax.   
 Standing against this option are several considerations.  One is that the 
revenue gains from taxing soft drinks may be less than the amounts expected by 
those who impose the tax.  The actual net revenue gains depend on a 
complicated chain of events that follows the imposition of the tax.  To the extent 
that demand is price elastic, and if the company passes the tax along to 
consumers, the consumption of soft drinks may be displaced in favor of 
                                            
8
 A poll conducted in the Netherlands in 1992, however, showed that most consumers strongly 
disagreed with the imposition of this tax (as reported in Bahl and Walker, 1999). 
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substitute items that may be taxed at lower rates. Reduced 
consumption/production of soft drinks will lead to reduced income, payroll and 
general consumption taxes, though some of this might be made up with 
expanded production of substitute goods.  Depending on these factors, the net 
revenue increase from a special excise tax on soft drinks may be small. 
Whatever net revenues are derived from a special excise tax will come at 
some cost and these should be carefully evaluated.  One cost is that an ad hoc 
tax levied on a single product might dissuade potential foreign investors for fear 
they would encounter the same treatment.  Another cost is the possible reduction 
in production in the bottling plants, which are a formal sector employer and 
therefore in the income tax net.  If the country is not operating at a full 
employment level, these workers may not be reabsorbed into the formal sector. 
 Finally, whenever a discriminatory tax is levied, the change in relative 
prices (in the absence of externalities) leads to an excess burden.  But since the 
revenues raised from the excise tax are usually so small, the excess burden will 
not be very great in terms of national impacts.  Bahl, Bird and Walker (2003) 
estimate that the welfare loss from elimination of the tax on soft drinks in Ireland 
is equivalent to only about one percent of the amount of revenue raised.  
 
9.2   Reform the Excise Tax  
Another option that may be considered in countries that impose a special 
excise on soft drinks, is to reform the tax structure.  A not-so-often discussed 
issue of soft drink taxation is the need to find a rate parity among all of the 
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substitute products in the soft drink category.  However, it is not uncommon to 
find rate differentials among non-alcoholic beverages including soft drinks, 
flavored waters, juices, and malt beverages.  Reform might concentrate on 
rationalizing the rate structure by taxing substitute goods at the same rate, unless 
there is a compelling reason not to.  In the cases mentioned above, sugar 
content might constitute such a reason, but it is not clear that this would lead to 
much differentiation in the rates between soft drinks, juices and flavored waters.   
However, it should be noted that in many countries, the tax rate on juices reflects 
the “real juice” content of the drink (e.g., 15 percent in Thailand). 
 A second dimension to the rate rationalization is the differential between 
the rate applied to soft drinks and that applied to liquor and beer.  One would 
imagine that at the least the externality argument would lead to large differences.  
However, in some countries, the differentials are small.  Reform in this area 
might focus on the estimated difference in social costs imposed by the 
consumption of these products. 
    
9.3   Eliminate the Excise Tax on Soft Drinks 
Some combination of all of the factors suggested above have led 
countries to reduce or eliminate the special excise on soft drinks. In the sample 
of countries considered here, many do not presently have such a special excise.  
Many other countries around the world have rolled their excises back.   
Perhaps the most persuasive argument behind the removal of the 
discriminatory taxes is that the revenue loss will be significantly dampened (or 
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offset) by an increase in consumption that would come from the lower price of 
soft drinks.  The thinking here is that a lower level of taxation would result in a 
lower price of soft drinks to consumers, production would expand and some of 
the loss in revenues would be recaptured by the increase in taxes on the 
imported content, the increased taxes on bottlers and distributors (income taxes 
and property taxes) and increases in the general sales tax.  In a case study of 
the impacts of eliminating the tax on soft drinks in Ireland, Bahl, Bird and Walker 
(2003) found that about 30 percent of the excise tax loss was recaptured.  There 
are two reasons why the recapture was not larger.  One is that all of the tax 
reduction was not passed along to the consumers in the form of price reductions.  
The second is that in order to increase output in the post-tax period, the soft drink 
company had to attract resources away from other producers, leading to some 
revenue losses in those sectors. In this respect, Ireland’s full employment 
economy is very different from the developing country situation, so the percent of 
revenue recaptured in the latter is likely greater than the 30 percent reported in 
this study. 
Bahl and Wallace (2006), using a similar methodology, estimated that 
there would be a recapture of 90 percent of the special excise tax revenues 
within five years if Ghana had eliminated their excise.  This study used a price 
elasticity of 1.5.  If a lower elasticity is used, the simulations show that a much 
longer time period will be needed to recapture the lost revenues.   
   
10   Conclusions 
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 What we might conclude from this paper is that soft drinks do not fit the 
model for a special excise tax in the same way as do cigarettes, alcoholic 
beverages and motor fuels.  Soft drinks are a class of consumer goods that 
contain a large amount of sugar, and this may be harmful to health, but there are 
a number of other goods that also contain the same harmful ingredients.  
Fairness would dictate treating all of these goods the same way under the tax 
code. The same may be said of the environmental costs of disposing of the 
packaging of soft drinks. 
Neither can a special excise on soft drinks lead to a noticeable 
improvement in the distribution of tax burdens, as can a tax on motor fuels or 
alcoholic beverages. The tax base is too small (less than one percent of 
consumption), and though higher income consumers do spend more for soft 
drinks, the degree of progression is mild. There are better ways to address 
questions of income redistribution. 
 So, this leaves us with the revenue raising motive for taxing soft drinks.  
What might be concluded on this count is that in order to raise significant 
revenue, the ad valorem rate on soft drinks will need to be quite high.  But, unlike 
other excise goods, soft drinks may not be subject to price inelastic demand.  
This means that part of the revenue potential of the tax will be lost to substitute 
goods that are taxed at a lower rate.  Some evidence has shown that the 
revenue loss from elimination of the special excise on soft drinks will be 
recaptured in expanded soft drink production.    
 What if government is not convinced by these arguments against a special 
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excise on soft drinks and moves ahead with imposition of such a tax.  What is the 
harm?  First, because the tax is so small, the excess burden is not likely to be 
large.  On the other hand, such ad hoc tax measures may dissuade investors for 
fear they would be treated the same way. There is also the complication that 
might be introduced to the tax system by bringing substitute goods into tax and 
resolving all of the difficulties due to this. A special excise on soft drinks that did 
not consider juices, flavored waters, energy drinks, etc. would invite unfairness 
into the tax system. All of this would divert energy away from the basic objectives 
of good administration of the broad based taxes.     
 The revenue needs are great in low income countries, and many African 
nations do impose special excises on soft drinks. Experience has taught that 
revenue needs and administrative ease can trump good tax policy.  As the tax 
systems in poor countries improves in its ability to capture the consumption base, 
it should become possible to abandon such stopgap revenue measures as 
special excises whose main virtue is the ease with which they may be taxed. 
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Table 1 
Summary of the Typical Tax Treatment of Soft Drinks: Ghana Example 
 
Tax Base Rate Discriminatory 
Treatment? 
Excise Ex Factory Price 
 
 20% Yes 
Custom duties  c.i.f. value 10% No 
 
VAT Ex Factory Price 
including excise tax 
 
15% Yes 
Company Income Tax Chargeable Income 
 
25% No 
PAYE Taxable Income 
 
Up to 25% No 
Total --- --- --- 
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Table 2 
VAT and Excise Tax Treatment of Luxury Goods in African Countries with a 
value added Tax 
 
Country VAT Rate  
(in percent) 
Excise Rate on Soft 
Drinks (in percent) 
Excise Rates on other 
“Luxuries” 
Benin 18 ? Soft drinks 
Botswana 10 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential oils, 
perfumery, fire arms (7%). 
Burkino Faso 18 10 Soft drinks, coffee, tea, cola 
nuts 
Cameroon 19.25 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential oils, 
perfumery, fire arms (7%). 
Câte ď Ivoire 20 7 Soft drinks 
Central African 
Republic  
18 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential oils, 
perfumery, fire arms (7%). 
Chad 18 5 Soft drinks 
Congo 18.9 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential oils, 
perfumery, fire arms (7%). 
Equatorial Guinea 15 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential oils, 
perfumery, fire arms (7%). 
Gabon 18 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential oils, 
perfumery, fire arms (7%). 
Ghana 12.5 20 Soft drinks 
Guinea 18 ? Soft drinks: specific tax 
Guinea-Bissau 10 5 Soft drinks, beer 
Kenya 16 0 Sugar, soft drinks 
Lesotho 14 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential oils, 
perfumery, fire arms (7%). 
Madagascar 18 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential oils, 
perfumery, fire arms (7%). 
Malawi 17.5 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential oils, 
perfumery, fire arms (7%). 
Mali 18 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential oils, 
perfumery, fire arms (7%). 
Mauritania 14 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential oils, 
perfumery, fire arms (7%). 
Mauritius 15 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential oils, 
perfumery, fire arms (7%). 
Mozambique 17 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential oils, 
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perfumery, fire arms (7%). 
Namibia 15 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential oils, 
perfumery, fire arms (7%). 
Niger  19 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential oils, 
perfumery, fire arms (7%). 
Nigeria 5 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential oils, 
perfumery, fire arms (7%). 
Senegal  18 2.75 Soft drinks 
South Africa 14 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential oils, 
perfumery, fire arms (7%). 
Tanzania 20 ? Soft drinks 
Togo 18 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential oils, 
perfumery, fire arms (7%). 
Uganda 17 ? Sugar, soft drinks 
Zambia 17.5 10 Soft drinks, mobile phone call 
time 
Zimbabwe 15 22.5 Soft drinks 
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Table 3 
Sales Tax and Excise Tax Treatment of Luxury Goods in African Countries 
that do not have a Value Added Tax 
 
Country Type of Sales 
Tax 
Standard 
Rate 
Excise Rate on 
Soft Drinks 
Excise Rate on other 
“Luxuries” 
Angola Production 10 20 Soft drinks 
Burundi Turnover 17 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential 
oils, perfumery, fire arms 
(7%). 
Comoros Turnover 10 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential 
oils, perfumery, fire arms 
(7%). 
Congo D.R. Turnover 13 ? Soft drinks 
Djibouti Import Tax 15 ? Mineral water, soft drinks, 
fruit juice 
Ethiopia  15 80 Mineral water, audio and 
video equipment, Soft 
drinks, dish washers 
Eritrea  10 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential 
oils, perfumery, fire arms 
(7%). 
Gambia  15 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential 
oils, perfumery, fire arms 
(7%). 
Liberia Production 14 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential 
oils, perfumery, fire arms 
(7%). 
Seychelles Production 12 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential 
oils, perfumery, fire arms 
(7%). 
Swaziland Production 14 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential 
oils, perfumery, fire arms 
(7%). 
Somalia Production 18.7 0 Toiletries, TV sets, office 
machines (5%); Essential 
oils, perfumery, fire arms 
(7%). 
 
 
 
